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Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study  
0. Introduction 
John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively 
required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or 
inaccessible to one (Gibbons 2013).1 Discussing a case in which an agent has perfectly good but 
misleading evidence that their keys are right now on their kitchen table, Gibbons says: 
What I call the natural reaction to the idea that you ought to believe when the keys are there and 
withhold when they’re not [despite what your good evidence tells you] is pretty much the same 
reaction that I have when people tell me that you ought to jump out the window of your hotel 
when you have no way of knowing about the fire in the basement (Gibbons 2013, p.161). 
The reaction amounts to the claim that this isn’t possible. Given what it is to be normatively required to 
Ø, one cannot be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first 
person perspective or inaccessible to one. To assess this claim, we need a view about the relationship 
between agents’ capacities to accord with normative requirements and the conditions under which those 
normative requirements obtain.2 In this paper, I offer a view of the epistemic dimension of this 
relationship.3 One goal is to provide enough of a story about the natural reaction to make accounting for it 
look like an important thing to do. That said, by “accounting for it” I do not mean endorsing the natural 
reaction. This would be one way to account for it. Another would be to explain it away. The main goal, 
then, is not to defend the claims implicit in the natural reaction, but to clarify and make them more precise 
so they can be more readily evaluated. 
To focus the discussion, I will use Timothy Williamson’s “E=K” view of evidence as an example of a 
view in epistemology that generates the natural reaction. An upshot of the discussion, then, is a detailed 
account of (what many take to be) a troubling feature of Williamson’s influential but controversial view 
of evidence. But I intend the results of the discussion to be relevant for any view with normative 
implications. Williamson supports E=K with a good deal of compelling argument. Moreover, he has 
general reasons for thinking that the epistemic implications of his view are inevitable—that is, that there 
can be no view about evidence (or anything, for that matter) that does not come with these epistemic 
implications.4 Williamson would point out, then, that these implications do not count against his view in 
particular. In light of all this, claiming that there is a natural reaction to E=K may seem pretty 
insignificant. Indeed, claiming that there is a natural reaction to any view is in itself of little dialectical 
significance. But if enough people have the reaction—and I agree with Gibbons that many people do—
then it needs to be accounted for. That is, if not endorsed then it should be explained away. So I want to 
give a more precise account of what needs to be endorsed or explained away. The more compelling these 
ideas are, the harder it will be to explain them away. To put it another way, the weaker the commitments 
behind the natural reaction turn out to be, the harder they will be to explain away. If there are strong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gibbons’ main concern is with what he calls “the ethicists’ notion of objective reasons” (Gibbons 2013, Ch.1).  
2 We also need a clear statement of what “normative requirements” are. I explain what I mean in Section One.  
3 As opposed to, say, the psychological or metaphysical dimensions of this relationship.  
4 I am referring to Williamson’s “anti-luminosity” argument (Williamson 2000).  
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considerations in support of a view that generates the natural reaction, this doesn’t yet count against the 
reaction, it merely generates a puzzle.  
The plan is as follows. In Section One, I address some preliminaries concerning the notion of normative 
requirements I have in mind in this paper. In Section Two, I introduce E=K and briefly explain why it 
generates the natural reaction. In Sections Three and Four, I use the view as a case study for investigating 
some preliminary accounts of the commitments underlying the natural reaction. In Sections Five to Eight, 
I take the shortcomings of the preliminary accounts to motivate a new account. The considered view I end 
up with turns on a finer-grained conception of responsibility than is often considered in this context. I 
argue that there is a crucial connection (“crucial” in a sense to be spelled out below) between 
“attributability” and normative requirements, and that there is an epistemic condition on attributability 
(Sections Five, Six and Seven). Taken together, these arguments give us an account of the epistemic 
conditions on normative requirements. I call the resulting view the Attributability View (Section Eight). I 
claim that one can account for the natural reaction by either endorsing the Attributability View or 
explaining away its intuitive plausibility.  
1. Normative Requirements  
I use the term “normative requirements” to isolate a narrower notion of normativity than is sometimes at 
issue in discussions about normativity and epistemic normativity in particular (Greco 2010; Sosa 2007; 
2011). We can speak of the “normative” broadly in contrast with the “descriptive”, but we can also speak 
of the “normative” more narrowly in contrast with the “evaluative”. For example, moral philosophers 
distinguish between judgments about what one is required, or obligated, or has a duty, or ought to do on 
the one hand, and judgments about what would be good or best on the other. In this paper I reserve the 
notion of “normativity” for claims about what one ought to do as opposed to what would be good or best. 
As is widely accepted, however, “ought” is itself ambiguous, or at least polysemous, in a variety of ways.5 
So I need to be more specific. 
Consider some examples. It’s easy to imagine a context in which it would be natural to read the following 
as an “ought” of obligation or duty or requirement (and thus something paradigmatically normative): 
a) You ought to stop eating animals.  
But consider another instance of “ought”: 
b) They ought to be here by now.  
This is not naturally read as stating an obligation, duty, or requirement. Indeed, b) is referred to as the 
“epistemic” or “predictive ought”. It has to do with what is likely or probable given our evidence (roughly 
speaking). At the very least, then, I might stipulate that I’m interested in the “ought” of obligation—that 
is, the one in example a). But even the notion of obligation is at least apparently ambiguous. For example, 
Michael Zimmerman (2008) distinguishes between “binding” and “non-binding” obligations. Consider 
the following: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Chrisman forthcoming.  
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c) Milton you ought to be living at this hour (as England needs you!).6 
This is an example of what Zimmerman would call an “ought” of non-binding obligation. It is also 
referred to as the “evaluative ought”. It evaluates some state of affairs relative to a given standard. In 
other words, it is one way of saying that it would be good or perhaps even best if Milton were alive (say, 
relative to standards of what would be morally and politically good for England). Meanwhile, I follow 
Zimmerman in saying that binding (moral) obligations settle the question of what a morally conscientious 
person ought to do in a given situation. In what follows, a generalized form of this latter notion (taken to 
include the epistemic domain, for example) is what I mean to isolate with my term “normative 
requirements”. In this paper I am interested in epistemic normativity, and not just moral normativity. It is 
of course controversial whether epistemic normativity should to be modeled on moral normativity in this 
way. However, I am less interested in whether epistemic normativity should to be understood this way, 
than in what the implications are of so understanding it. For those who think differently about epistemic 
normativity, the following discussion can be seen as material for drawing out potentially undesirable 
implications of an opponents’ way of thinking about epistemic normativity. 
One final important preliminary point. A widely endorsed idea is that there is a further ambiguity between 
objective and subjective senses of “obligation”. It might be said of Gibbons’ case above, for example, that 
the person has an objective obligation to jump out the window, while they do not have a subjective 
obligation to do so. The difference between these two senses is helpfully articulated in epistemic terms. 
On one hand, we can be objectively obligated to do that which is in some sense outside our first person 
perspective, or epistemically inaccessible to us. On the other hand, what we are subjectively obligated to 
do is always within our first person perspective and accessible to us. Insofar as this paper is about 
epistemic conditions on “ought”, one way of thinking about its argument is as an argument against 
positing this sort of ambiguity. In other words, it explains why someone might think there is no 
“objective” sense of “normative requirement”.7 The natural reaction is a reaction to that very idea. 
2. E=K and the Natural Reaction 
Williamson starts with the idea of a body of evidence. Agents draw on a body of evidence in evaluating 
hypotheses and updating their beliefs about the world around them. His thesis is that p belongs to an 
agent’s body of evidence if and only if the agent knows that p. One’s total evidence is equal to one’s total 
knowledge, or E=K. This thesis about evidence partly motivates, and is partly motivated by, Williamson’s 
broader “knowledge first” epistemology. Those details can be put to one side here. Williamson provides 
multiple arguments from the function of evidence that work independently of the knowledge first 
programme.  
We can see what I’m interested in about Williamson’s view most readily by considering two things. First, 
consider the following normative requirement:  
EVIDENTIAL NORM: Agents ought to proportion their beliefs to the evidence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The example is borrowed from Chrisman (forthcoming), who borrows it from Wedgwood (2007), but it comes 
from Wordsworth’s sonnet “London, 1802”.  
7 It’s important to keep the stipulated senses of these terms in mind when reading the above sentence. 
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What it means exactly takes some careful spelling out.8 But I’m focusing on a very general and rough 
idea—the idea that agents are subject to a normative requirement concerning how their beliefs are 
proportioned to the evidence they have. Next, consider the classic “brain in a vat” (BIV) scenario. In a 
distant possible world, unbeknownst to you, your brain has been removed from your skull and put in a 
vat. In the vat, your brain is stimulated by a supercomputer such that everything you experience is 
phenomenologically identical to the actual world. So you continue to believe, for example, that you have 
hands. Of course, as a mere brain in a vat you no longer have hands. The point is the following. Given 
that your evidence is, and only is, what you know according to E=K, your evidence does not include the 
proposition expressed by the sentence “I have hands”. Thus, in believing with complete conviction that 
you have hands (as you would), you fail to proportion your beliefs correctly to the evidence. You violate 
the evidential norm. Williamson will be the first to claim that you have a perfectly good excuse for 
believing that you have hands. In that respect, your belief is not a complete normative failing. But it 
remains true—as Williamson would put it—that your belief does not have the “full normative status” it 
would have were it correctly proportioned to the evidence. I return to the issue of excuses in a few places 
below.  
In general, because knowledge has an important externalist component(s)—at the very least, knowledge 
is factive—you can fail to be in a position to know whether you know that p. But given E=K and the 
evidential norm, this just means that you can fail to be in a position to know that you are normatively 
required to believe that p—which is of course a specific instance of the idea that you can be normatively 
required to Ø when this is in some sense outside your first person perspective or inaccessible to you. And 
that idea is what Gibbons claims generates the natural reaction. So, Williamson’s view of evidence is a 
view in epistemology that generates the natural reaction.  
3. Deliberation-Guidance 
I turn now to some different approaches to spelling out the commitments underlying the natural reaction. 
The first approach starts by noting the following. We use evidence in our deliberations about what to 
believe, and thus indirectly in our deliberations about what to do. For example, when thinking about 
whether you stole my bike or not, I consider what evidence I have in support of thinking this. This is a 
good example because a lot hangs on something like accusing someone of stealing my bike. And it’s 
often the case that a lot hangs on what one believes given their evidence. We might wonder, then, whether 
the sort of opacity of our evidence on Williamson’s view has counterintuitive consequences in light of 
this important function of evidence. Williamson recognizes this: “How can one follow the rule 
‘proportion your belief in p to your evidence for p’ when one doesn’t know exactly what one’s evidence 
is?” (Williamson 2000, p.192). I will call this the “deliberation-guidance” worry. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 According to Williamson, the requirements of rationality tell you to proportion your beliefs to the evidence. “If 
rationality requires one to respect one's evidence, then it is irrational not to respect one's evidence” (Williamson 
2000, Ch.8). This is a normative requirement. Although the details are complex, the basic idea is that your degree of 
confidence that p ought to be proportioned to the probability that p given your evidence. If the probability that p 
given your evidence is 1, then you ought, for example, simply outright believe that p (believe to a degree of 
confidence of 1). If the probability that p given your evidence is less than 1, then you ought to have something less 
than outright belief that p. Perhaps you ought to believe that p is probable to n degrees, or perhaps you ought to have 
some distinct propositional attitude that is in some sense less committal about the fact that p – the details are 
unimportant here. 
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The deliberation-guidance worry can be sharpened in the following way. Call a norm “operationalizable” 
just in case, “if one knows the norm, one is always able to use the norm as a premise in a competent 
deduction, together with one’s knowledge of whether the norm’s triggering condition obtains, to come to 
know whether one is acting in conformity with the norm” (Srinivasan unpublished, p.11).9 For example, 
the norm “One ought to proportion one’s beliefs to the evidence” is operationalizable just in case one can 
use it in a competent deduction, together with their knowledge that they now have evidence E and degree 
of credence C on E, to come to know whether they believe in conformity with the norm. The idea is that 
such knowledge is necessary for being “guided” by a norm. One must be able to know whether one is 
acting in accord with the norm or not in order to properly be counted as being guided by the norm. 
Without such knowledge, the deliberation-guidance worry goes, one’s accordance with a norm is at best a 
sort of accident—in which case it’s questionable that one deserves a normative status for believing in 
accordance with the norm. So the problem with Williamson’s view, according to this worry, is that it 
renders the evidential norm “unoperationalizable.”  
How serious is the deliberation-guidance worry? On one hand, Williamson argues that the opacity of our 
evidence, on his view, is not extensive enough to give this concern any bite. He says: “Although we have 
no infallible procedure for determining whether we know p, in practice we are often in a position to know 
whether we know p” (Williamson 2000, p.193). The point is that the fact that we are “often” in a position 
to know whether we know p is enough to dismiss the deliberation-guidance worry. While it might be true 
that we could not use our evidence to guide deliberation (and indirectly action) if we were never in a 
position to know what our evidence is, this doesn’t entail that we cannot use our evidence to guide 
deliberation given that we are often (though not always) in a position to know what our evidence is. 
Compare the following example from Srinivasan: 
SEDER NORM: When setting the table for Passover, one ought to set as many places as there 
will be Seder guests plus one. 
Srinivasan notes that, while it’s true that one is not always in a position to know how many guests one 
will have at one’s Passover Seder (there may be unexpected arrivals, or someone might get sick), we can 
clearly employ such a norm in our reasoning about what to do at Passover. It seems a stretch to call it a 
mere accident when we get the number of places right, even though we aren’t always in a position to 
know how many guests there will be. Norms can guide us even if we’re not always in a position to know 
what they tell us to do.  
This seems fair enough.10 One might insist that “None of this would be much consolation if our beliefs 
about our knowledge were hopelessly unreliable. Sceptics say that those beliefs have no rational basis...” 
(Williamson 2000, p.193). If scepticism is true, then it is simply false that we are often (even if not 
always) in a position to know what our evidence is (given E=K). But rather than pursuing that issue any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Here is Srinivasan’s explanation of her own terminology: “A norm is a universal generalisation about how one 
ought to conduct one’s practical or doxastic affairs, involving a normative state N and a triggering condition C, of 
the form “N if/and/only if C” (Srinivasan unpublished, p.6).  We can think of Srinivasan’s phrase “triggering 
condition” as meaning the condition under which an agent counts as being in a normative state.  
10 One might insist that a fuller version of this sort of response provides a principled answer to the question: “how 
often is often enough?” I won’t pursue this here.  
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further—it seems fair to assume the falsity of scepticism in the present context—it will be instructive to 
pursue a deeper issue.11 
4. Blameworthiness 
It is plausible that what is behind the deliberation-guidance worry is a deeper worry about the idea that 
one could ever be normatively required to Ø when one is not in a position to know that one is required to 
Ø.12 Srinivasan suggests that what lies behind such a worry is a desire to align the “deontological” and 
“hypological” perspectives (Srinivasan, p.14). The deontological perspective is the perspective from 
which we make judgments about whether an agent conforms to normative requirements – i.e. their 
binding obligations, duties, what they ought to do or think, etc. The hypological perspective is the 
perspective from which we make judgments about whether an agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy for 
their actions or attitudes. One reason we might think that these perspectives should be aligned is if we 
think that judgments of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are in some sense central to the very idea 
of normative requirements.  Indeed, the thought goes, we might think that they are so central that it’s 
difficult to understand the possibility of a mismatch between the conditions under which someone is 
blameworthy and the conditions under which they count as violating a normative requirement. Whether 
one is blameworthy intuitively depends on whether they are in a position to know that the conditions 
under which they would be blameworthy obtain (Williamson would agree, as we can see from his appeal 
to excuses).13 Thus, allowing that one might ever violate a norm when one is not in a position to know 
that its triggering conditions obtain effectively introduces a mismatch between conditions of 
blameworthiness and conditions of norm-violation. And so, on the present assumption, it is to misplace 
something central about normativity. We can sharpen the idea that blameworthiness is “central” to 
normativity in the following way. Call it the “hypological principle” (H): 
(H): S ought to Ø only if, if S doesn’t Ø, then S is blameworthy for not Ø-ing.     
The principle says that it’s only true that S is normatively required to Ø if, were they not to Ø, they would 
be blameworthy for not Ø-ing. A good way to see this principle in action is to consider the following 
case:  
 Suppose Kate, a generally thoughtful person, brings some soup to her friend Mary, who is down 
with the flu. And suppose further that Kate isn’t in a position to know that the soup contains an 
allergen that, rather than making Mary feel better, will make her more ill. In trying her best to 
help her friend, Kate inadvertently makes her friend worse off (Srinivasan, p.15). 
Intuitively, Kate is not blameworthy for making her friend worse off.14 But notice that Kate violates the 
normative requirements of at least some possible normative theories. For example, to put it roughly, if we 
assume that Kate only had the choice of either giving Mary the soup or not, and that Kate’s giving Mary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Srinivasan points out a second objection to the deliberation-guidance worry. This is that the deliberation-guidance 
worry seems to presuppose that our practical and cognitive lives, when they go well, are a rule-governed affair. That 
is, it seems to presuppose that well-lived practical and cognitive lives involve actively applying general rules to 
specific cases. She notes that there are many reasons to think that is an implausible (Srinivasan unpublished, p.13). 
12 As opposed to a worry about whether we are often enough in the relevant position to know.  
13 See footnote 15 for brief further discussion on why this is plausible.  
14 To make this even more plausible, imagine that Kate was very cautious in checking all the allergens and that she 
asked Mary about her allergies. 
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the soup reduces the overall good, then Kate violates a consequentialist norm of action that says: “One 
ought to Ø iff Ø-ing would maximise the good”. But according to (H), the following claim is true: 
Kate ought to maximize the good only if, if Kate doesn’t maximize the good, then Kate is 
blameworthy for not maximizing the good.     
Because Kate is intuitively not to blame for not maximizing the good here, (H) tells us that it’s false that 
she really ought to have done so—i.e. it’s false that she violated a normative requirement in bringing 
Mary the soup. Thus, the consequentialist norm is false according to the (H) principle. We can see how 
this is relevant to E=K by considering the BIV case. As virtually everyone agrees (including Williamson), 
the BIV is not blameworthy for falsely believing that she has hands. But of course, if E=K is true, then by 
believing that she has hands the BIV violates the evidential norm. She fails to proportion her beliefs to the 
evidence because she fails to proportion her beliefs to what she knows. But according to (H), the 
following claim is true: 
S ought to proportion her beliefs to what she knows only if, if S doesn’t proportion her beliefs to 
what she knows, then S is blameworthy for not proportioning her beliefs to what she knows.     
(H) tells us that it’s false that she really ought to have proportioned her belief to what she knows. E=K 
conflicts with the (H) principle. The account of course extends beyond BIV cases. Any case in which an 
agent is not blameworthy, according to the (H) principle, will fail to be a case in which a normative 
requirement has been violated. Insofar as we find it plausible that agents are generally not blameworthy 
for Ø-ing when they are not in a position to know that they are Ø-ing, the (H) principle delivers an 
epistemic condition on normative requirements.15 It tells us that people cannot be normatively required to 
Ø when they are not in a position to know that they are normatively required to Ø. The (H) principle is 
thus a candidate for being at least one of the basic commitments underlying the natural reaction.  
Why think that blameworthiness is central to normativity, or in other words that (H) is true? It’s 
interesting that Srinivasan, the person to whom this diagnosis of the natural reaction is due, doesn’t 
provide much of an explanation for why we might think this in the first place. Rather, her suggestion is 
accompanied by claims such as: “The hypological perspective has a strong grip on contemporary 
normative philosophy, and perhaps contemporary culture more generally. Perhaps this is a result both of 
overconfidence in our theoretical powers and naïveté about the place of luck in human life” (Srinivasan 
unpublished, p. 34). Srinivasan’s aim in introducing this diagnosis is to challenge the natural reaction. 
The following is worth quoting in full:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 There is wide agreement about the epistemic dimension of blame, though this is of course a complicated issue. I 
touch on one dimension of this complexity in Section Six. In any case, one reason we might think that 
blameworthiness gives rise to general considerations about access has to do with the intuitive incompatibility of 
judgments of blameworthiness with what Williams (1976, 1981) and Nagel (1979) call “moral luck” or “resultant 
luck” (respectively). The Kate and Mary case is an example of “bad resultant luck.” As Srinivasan puts it, “this form 
of luck is present when one’s ignorance of the relevant circumstantial facts prohibits one from controlling the 
outcome or result of one’s actions” (Srinivasan unpublished, p.15). Kate is not blameworthy for what she’s done to 
Mary, and an issue about luck, which is perhaps best understood in terms of an issue about epistemic access, seems 
like precisely the relevant feature of the case. That is, the best explanation for why she is not to blame is that she was 
not in a position to know that the soup contains the allergen. Such reflections on resultant luck highlight the 
plausibility of an accessibility condition on blameworthiness. 
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Consider a political leader who, doing his best to act on his evidence and follow his conscience, 
leads his country into an illegal, immoral and materially devastating war. That he is in some 
sense excused for so doing is and should be of little interest to those who are not his biographer. 
Indeed, a first personal fixation on one’s own culpability seems to indulge a narcissism deeply 
at odds with the normative. It is fine and important to tell children that all that matters is that 
they try their best. But when this thought becomes a complete consolation for failure – when I, 
harming you, care only that I am trying my best not to – I have abandoned the deontological 
perspective. Williams launches a similar criticism against the Christian outlook when he says 
that it “associates morality simultaneously with benevolence, self-denial, and inner directedness 
or guilt (shame before God or oneself)” [(Williams 1981, p. 244)]. Seeking to avoid blame, 
moral or epistemic, is a form of cowardice, a turning inward of the normative perspective 
(Srinivasan unpublished, p.34).  
Ultimately, I am sympathetic to these remarks. They pose a problem for aligning the deontological and 
hypological perspectives. For example, the case of the political leader seems like a counterexample to 
(H). The claim that 
S ought not to have led his country into an illegal, immoral and materially devastating war only 
if, if S did so, then S is blameworthy for leading his country into an illegal, immoral and 
materially devastating war 
seems false.16 But there are more significant worries. For example, (H) seems to render excuses 
impossible. One way of putting what (H) says is that the presence of an excusing condition serves to 
undermine the judgment that a normative requirement has been violated. On this view, having an excuse 
just means that one’s action or attitude fails to violate the relevant norm(s). But this just means that there 
can be no cases of excused norm violation. And if there can be no such cases, it is hard to imagine any 
cases of an excused action or attitude. Needless to say, this doesn’t fit well with our actual practices of 
holding people responsible for their actions and attitudes. We excuse people all the time.  
While I agree with Srinivasan that (H) is implausible, I don’t take this in itself to diffuse the natural 
reaction.17 We should look elsewhere for a view of the commitments underlying the natural reaction. The 
guiding idea in the rest of this paper is that a way forward can be found in a finer-grained account of 
responsibility. To be sure, blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are obviously closely connected to 
responsibility. So we might think that the view that blameworthiness is central to normativity just is the 
view that responsibility is central to normativity. But there are at least three different notions of 
responsibility relevant to our purposes. Examining the differences between these notions will allow us to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 However, the details are complicated. For example, it is important to keep some things in mind about 
blameworthiness before doing away with (H). It is important to note, first, that (H) doesn’t imply that violation of 
normative requirements goes hand in hand with the appropriateness of blame. There are important differences 
between the conditions of the appropriateness of blaming someone, and the conditions blameworthiness. For one 
thing, blaming is highly positional in nature—for example, being implicated in the wrongdoing of some other agent 
can place constraints on the appropriateness of one blaming that agent. Meanwhile, while blameworthiness is also 
considered by some to be to a certain degree positional in nature, it is arguably less so (Kelly 2013). And we might 
think that since violating normative requirements is not a positional matter, the idea that there is some essential 
connection between blameworthiness and norm violation is at least more plausible than the idea that there is some 
essential connection between the appropriateness of actual blame responses and norm violation.  
17 Srinivasan doesn’t herself formulate the desire to align the deontological and hypological perspectives in terms of 
the (H) principle. That is something I’ve taken the liberty of doing here.  
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see in more detail why (H) is implausible. Moreover, a picture will emerge that provides a more plausible, 
though closely related, way of spelling out the natural reaction—one that can accommodate cases like the 
political leader case, and avoid the unpalatable upshot of making excuses impossible. 
5. Responsibility 
An influential idea in contemporary moral philosophy is to understand responsibility broadly in terms of 
being open to a particular range of moral responses. Peter Strawson’s seminal “Freedom and Resentment” 
(1962) focused on reactive attitudes such as gratitude, guilt, indignation and resentment. Recent work due 
to Tim Scanlon (1998; 2008) and Angela Smith (2005; 2012) broadly continues this approach, but with a 
subtler view of the types of moral responses that are relevant to responsibility. One of the primary 
motivations for Scanlon’s and Smith’s views about responsibility is that they can account for a 
comprehensive range of moral responses involved in our moral practices. For example, contrasting her 
view with what she calls volitional views of responsibility, Smith claims that she can more readily 
account for our practices of holding each other responsible for attitudes and actions over which it seems 
we have no immediate voluntary control (like forgetting one’s best friend’s birthday, or failing to notice 
something).  
I am interested in a criticism of the Scanlon/Smith view due to David Shoemaker (2011).18  Shoemaker is 
sympathetic to the general approach. But he argues it isn’t comprehensive enough. In particular, he thinks 
we need a finer-grained view that, while taking the basic picture as a starting point, distinguishes between 
three types of responsibility: attributability, answerability, and accountability. I am particularly interested 
in Shoemaker’s claim that “accountability” is something distinct from “attributability”. I am interested 
because, according to Shoemaker (and others),19 attributability is a form of responsibility that comes apart 
from blameworthiness. According to Shoemaker, blameworthiness is tied to accountability, but not 
attributability. Before getting into his argument, it will be helpful to explain the Scanlon/Smith view 
briefly. 
It is helpful to articulate the view by starting with the idea that being responsible for an action or attitude 
implies a special kind of activity. This is why we do not hold each other morally responsible for our 
heights, and why we do not hold avalanches morally responsible for destroying villages. A key 
desideratum for any theory of responsibility is accounting for the intuitive idea that responsibility for 
actions and attitudes implies a special kind of activity. Volitional views, for example, account for this in 
terms of choice, decision, or voluntary control.20 An agent is responsible for Φ-ing only if the agent 
made/is able to make some kind of past, present or future choice concerning Φ-ing. Rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In what follows I speak of the “Scanlon/Smith view”, but I do not mean to suggest by this terminology that 
Scanlon and Smith have collaborated or explicitly endorse each other’s views on responsibility (though this happens 
to be true of Smith, at least). I use this terminology simply to engage with Shoemaker, who groups the two together 
as representatives of broadly the same sort of view about responsibility (for my purposes, the relevant thing shared 
between them is understanding responsibility in terms of an agent’s being open to a certain range of moral 
responses). 
19 See Watson (2011). 
20 As Smith notes, the “volitional” view is a loose cluster of views with important differences. Roughly, they share a 
commitment to the idea that choice, decision or voluntary control is central to responsibility. Smith briefly points out 
differences between “prior choice” views, “endorsement” views, and “voluntary control” views. See Smith (2005), 
p. 240). 
10	  
	  
accounting for the activity involved in responsible actions and attitudes in these terms, the Smith/Scanlon 
view focuses on what Smith calls rational activity. Smith calls her view of responsibility the “rational 
relations” view. 
As moral agents, we each have a set of “evaluative commitments.” Evaluative commitments are not 
always, or even very often, consciously held propositional beliefs. Rather, according Smith, they are 
tendencies to treat certain things as having evaluative significance. As such, they are often things we 
discover about ourselves through our responses to situations, as opposed to things we consciously choose. 
To use Smith’s example, “I may discover in some situation that I care more about being liked by others 
than I do about standing up for my moral principles” (Smith 2005, p. 252). On the rational relations view, 
our evaluative commitments—“the basic evaluative framework through which we view the world”—are 
the core of what makes us open to moral assessment for our actions and attitudes. This is because, 
according to the view, moral assessment of a person’s actions or attitudes is a kind of demand that that 
person “acknowledge and defend or disavow the judgments that are implicit in her responses to the world 
around her” (Smith 2005, p.256). Evaluative commitments are susceptible to the sort of critical reflection 
and requests for justification implicit in our practice of moral assessment. As such, on the rational 
relations view, a person’s evaluative commitments (rather than their conscious choices, or what they 
identify with, or what they have voluntary control over) are the seat of their status as a responsible agent. 
But how does this tell us anything about our responsibility for particular actions and attitudes, such as my 
belief that the U.S needs more gun control, or my fear of flying?  
The idea is that our particular actions and attitudes stand in a rational relation to our evaluative 
commitments. That is to say, most of the time, our actions and attitudes rationally follow from, or fail to 
follow from, our evaluative commitments (Smith 2005). For example, if I judge that flying is perfectly 
safe, but do everything in my power to avoid flying when flying is something I need to do, very roughly 
we might say that my acts of avoiding flying fail to follow from my judgment that flying is perfectly safe. 
As Smith puts it, the relation is a normative one: given what my judgments about flying are, other things 
being equal, I should not be avoiding it at all costs. The fact that we usually call this kind of behavior 
irrational is one way of bringing out the general idea of a rational connection between particular attitudes 
or actions and an agent’s evaluative commitments.  
But importantly, we hold each other morally responsible precisely in virtue of substantive critical 
engagement with our evaluative commitments. For example, take Jim’s attitude of hatred towards 
Indigenous Canadians. According to the rational relations view, Jim’s hatred of Indigenous Canadians is 
open to moral assessment, not because it is freely chosen, or because it is something he “identifies” with, 
or because it is something under his voluntary control (though all of these things may be true); rather, 
Jim’s hatred is open to moral assessment because it stands in a direct rational relation to his evaluative 
commitments: for example, we can imagine that (whether he knows it or not) Jim thinks that a person’s 
worth is determined by their intelligence, and that a person’s intelligence is determined by their race. 
These evaluative judgments are substantively mistaken. Jim is thus open to moral criticism, not just for 
these evaluative commitments, but for the actions and attitudes that are rationally connected to them. 
In sum, according to Smith, we are responsible for our actions and attitudes precisely in virtue of (and 
only in virtue of) the fact that they bear a rational connection to our evaluative commitments. When 
someone Φs, they can in principle be called upon to justify the particular evaluative commitments that 
11	  
	  
their Φ-ing implies. The main point here is that this is how the view accounts for the intuitive idea that 
responsibility requires a certain kind of activity. It requires the in-principle capacity to reflect upon and 
justify one’s evaluative commitments. It is a view that fits within the Strawsonian picture of thinking of 
moral responsibility in terms of being open to a certain range of moral responses. It is also a view that 
contains important theoretical resources that I will expand on below.  
It is worth emphasizing that one of the primary motivations for the Scanlon/Smith view of responsibility 
is that it can account for a comprehensive range of moral responses involved in our moral practices. For 
example, again contrasting the view with the volitional view of responsibility, it is a familiar feature of 
our moral practices that people are open to moral assessment for their impulses and spontaneous 
reactions—indeed, we often take a person’s spontaneous reactions to reveal deeper moral features of 
them than the considered and controlled behavior they manifest. And while volitional views of 
responsibility have a hard time accounting for this, the Scanlon/Smith view is poised to do so. This makes 
the view interesting in the context of epistemology. After all, our beliefs are not typically under voluntary 
control. And if we are responsible for our beliefs in the way implied, for example, by the EVIDENTIAL 
NORM, then it seems we had better have an account of responsibility for belief that does not imply that 
our beliefs are under voluntary control. The rational relations view is well-suited to provide an account of 
responsibility for belief in this respect. 
6. Attributability 
All of this said, I am interested in Shoemaker’s argument that the rational relations view is not 
comprehensive enough. On one hand, he argues that the implication of the view that responsibility is 
connected in-principle to the agent’s ability to justify their evaluative commitments is too strong. He 
distinguishes between answerability (a notion of responsibility that entails the ability to justify) and mere 
attributability (a notion of responsibility that does not entail the ability to justify). An action or attitude is 
merely attributable to an agent if it in some sense expresses the agent’s evaluative commitments, where 
the agent cannot reasonably be expected to justify anything.21 (Importantly, Smith uses the language of 
attributability to mark out her basic notion of responsibility, and I will continue to use it as such as well. 
Indeed, as Shoemaker himself points out, his dispute with Smith at this stage concerns what is necessary 
for attributability. He thinks it is something weaker than answerability. In any case, this is why I 
sometimes refer to Shoemaker’s notion of attributability as mere attributability. But this dispute is not my 
focus here).  
Shoemaker also argues that we need a distinction between attributability and accountability. To get a 
sense of his argument, we can start with two cases. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Shoemaker appeals to cases of arational caring, such as a mother’s continuing care for her son who has turned 
into a serial killer (to take an extreme example), or a person’s pining for their abusive ex-lover. He suggests that this 
sort of caring is something the agent has, merely in virtue of standing in a sort of “mine-ness” relation to something 
or someone, and that requesting reasons in justification for one’s care would be pointless. The sort of moral 
responses that Shoemaker thinks justifies referring to mere attributability as a genuine kind of responsibility are 
what he calls aretaic assessments. For example, we think of the mother as loyal, or “generous to a fault”, in caring 
for her son. Aretaic assessments are genuinely moral responses, Shoemaker argues, insofar as they have significant 
practical upshots when deciding who to make plans with, associate with, “who to work on loving more”, and so on 
(Shoemaker 2011, p.615).  
12	  
	  
ANNIVERSARY: George and Martha have been married for several years. Each year as their 
anniversary approaches, Martha drops subtle but increasingly forceful hints about the sort of gift 
she would greatly appreciate for their anniversary. These should merely be hints, she thinks, 
because were she to have to tell George explicitly what she wants and where to get it, his 
gesture would be less a gift than an errand. Unfortunately, each year George misses the hint and 
buys her some carnations, her least favorite flower. After the tenth year this happens, Martha 
gives up, deeply disappointed in George. The next year she accepts the carnations with as much 
feigned enthusiasm as she can muster, but she is no longer disposed to be as chipper about their 
anniversary or certain ceremonial aspects of it, nor is she disposed to pay as much attention to 
George’s hints about what he would like for various holidays. 
CHEATING: George and Martha have been married for several years. One evening, while 
George is taking a shower, Martha answers his cell phone, but the caller immediately hangs up. 
She notices that George has received many calls from this particular number recently, and she 
then discovers a texting thread from this number, along with texting threads from many other 
numbers. The texts leave no doubt that George has been having multiple affairs. When 
confronted with this evidence, George initially denies it but then gives in and admits it. Martha 
is furious, and she reaches for the closest object she can find to swing at George. It is a golf 
club, which he successfully dodges. He runs for the car. 
        (Shoemaker 2011, p.620) 
These cases exhibit two very different kinds of moral response. What explains the appropriateness of this 
difference? Shoemaker’s explanation is that two very different kinds of standards in George and Martha’s 
marriage are flouted in each case. We can call the standards flouted in ANNIVERSARY, “standards of 
aspiration”. These define what George and Martha can hope for from each other as a married couple. 
They “spell out the range of potential for the relationship, determining what would enable the relationship 
to flourish” (Shoemaker 2012, p. 621). We can call the standards flouted in CHEATING, “standards of 
permission”.22 These define what George and Martha can expect and demand from each other as a 
married couple. They are conditions the following of which makes the relationship possible. Shoemaker 
calls them “relationship-defining demands” (Shoemaker 2011, p.621).  
Shoemaker’s view is that when (and only when) relationship-defining demands are flouted, full-blown 
blame responses are warranted. The idea is that this is best explanation of the difference in moral 
responses in ANNIVERSARY and CHEATING. A fuller defence of this claim would take us too far 
afield. For my purposes, the crux of the point is that being responsive to relationship-defining demands is 
a capacity that we should see as something over and above being a fit subject for moral responses 
generally. In other words, Shoemaker concludes, there are two different kinds of responsibility that go 
hand in hand with these two different kinds of capacity—accountability and attributability (we can 
understand the latter either in terms of answerability or mere attributability). While accountability 
requires responsiveness to relationship-defining demands, attributability merely requires that one’s 
actions and attitudes “reflect” or express or stand in a rational relation to one’s evaluative commitments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This is my terminology, not Shoemaker’s. 
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The basic idea I am interested in is the idea that being accountable—being open to full-blown blame 
responses—is something over and above being attributable. In this way, there may be room to understand 
the natural reaction in terms of a notion of responsibility that does not imply blameworthiness, and 
thereby avoids the pitfalls of the (H) view. That said, so far it likely seems that drawing this distinction in 
the present context is merely an ad hoc way of opening up some conceptual space vis-à-vis the project of 
explaining the natural reaction. To further motivate the distinction independently of that project, then, it is 
worth looking briefly at Shoemaker’s application of this distinction to a case that raises difficult questions 
for theories of moral responsibility—namely, the case of psychopaths.23  
Shoemaker argues that psychopaths can be attributable but not accountable in at least some central cases. 
The reason why is that accountability, by virtue of its essentially social structure—recall, it is spelled out 
in terms of responsiveness to relationship-defining demands—implies certain capacities which the 
psychopath lacks. These are capacities to recognize the reasons implied by the relationship-defining 
demands at play in their relationships with others. As Gary Watson puts it (in a discussion of the case of 
psychopaths that shares significant similarities with Shoemaker’s):  
[P]sychopathy (as I read the evidence) precisely involves an incapacity to recognize the interests 
of others as making any valid claims on them. Consequently, they are disabled from standing in 
the reciprocal relations or (to use another idiom) from engaging in the mutual recognition that 
lies at the core of moral life. In John Rawls’s sense, they lack the features of moral personality: 
a sense of justice and a conception of the good (Watson 2011, p.307). 
By appeal to an “ought implies can” principle, Shoemaker argues that the psychopath cannot be held 
accountable for her actions and attitudes (importantly, Shoemaker means morally accountable – he claims 
that there is no reason why we cannot stand in other kinds of non-moral relationships with psychopaths, 
such as an “aesthetic relation” or “fellow citizenry relation,” and thereby hold the psychopath accountable 
in these non-moral arenas).24 This is because the psychopath lacks the relevant capacities required in 
order to do so. Nevertheless, we can still understand the psychopath as responsible in the sense of 
attributable. The psychopath’s actions and attitudes are rationally connected to his evaluative 
commitments, they are expressions of his self qua agent.  
Imagine a psychopath who cheats an elderly woman of out her life savings. If Shoemaker is right, the 
psychopath is not accountable for this action. The psychopath is insensitive to the key moral relationship-
defining demand that he be sensitive to the elderly woman’s interests.25 Thus, Shoemaker claims that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 I rely on Watson’s (2011) characterization of the psychopathic profile: “Psychopaths (as such) suffer no 
psychoses or notable neuroses, or general deficits of intelligence. Their condition is characterized by callous 
interpersonal relations, lack of significant attachment to other people or institutions (shallow and fleeting 
“friendships,” amorous relations, and loyalties), lack of a sense of shame and guilt, lack of self-criticism, refusal to 
take responsibility for the troubles caused to others or oneself, and lack of sincere commitment to long-term goals. 
Psychopathy is present from childhood and, by all indications, endures a lifetime. As this description implies, this 
condition has proven unamenable to psychopharmacological or psychological therapies and treatments” (Watson 
2011, p. 308).  
24 Shoemaker’s key point is that psychopaths are incapable of recognizing moral relationship-defining standards, 
recognition of which is necessary (according to Shoemaker) for an agent to be held morally accountable. 
25The point is not that the psychopath cannot understand that some moral relationship-defining demand applies to 
him. The point is that the psychopath is incapable of seeing that the demand is reason-giving. “Let me be clear: the 
psychopath may well understand that there is a demand being made of him; what he cannot understand is that the 
demand is reason-giving. There are facts being presented to him that he judges irrelevant—“Yes, I understand that 
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“The kind of moral address involved in holding someone accountable is thus pointless with respect to the 
psychopath” (Shoemaker 2011, p.629). This explains why there is a good case to be made that the 
psychopath is not an appropriate target of blame. This is not to say that blame wouldn’t be 
understandable in such a case (i.e. it’s understandable that, for example, the elderly woman would blame 
the psychopath). The point is that blame would be unreasonable.26 Nevertheless, it is intuitive to treat the 
psychopath as morally responsible for this action. And the notion of responsibility Shoemaker thinks is 
appropriate for this case is attributability.  
Notice that it is also plausible to regard the psychopath’s action as violating some moral requirement. The 
psychopath does something wrong in cheating the elderly woman out of her life savings. This is a case, 
then, in which blameworthiness and a violation of normative requirements plausibly come apart. In other 
words, it is another case like Srinivasan’s case of the political leader above. It seems like a 
counterexample to the following claim: 
S ought not to have cheated the elderly woman out of her life savings only if, if S did cheat the 
elderly woman out of her life savings, then S is blameworthy for cheating the elderly woman 
out of her life savings.    
What is important about this case is that it is still a case of attributability. This motivates a view about the 
nature of normative requirements that is different, but closely related to the (H) view. We can put it in the 
form of the following principle. Call it the “attributability principle” (A):  
(A): S ought to Ø only if, if S doesn’t Ø, then S is attributability-responsibile for not Ø-ing 
The idea is that attributability, as opposed to blameworthiness, is central to the notion of a normative 
requirement. What (A) says is that it’s only true that S is normatively required to Ø if, were they not to Ø, 
they would be attributability-responsible for not Ø-ing. (A) seems to avoid some of the implausible 
implications of (H). For example, the psychopath case is not a counterexample to the following claim: 
S ought not to have cheated the elderly woman out of her life savings only if, if S did cheat the 
elderly woman out of her life savings, then S is attributability-responsible for cheating the 
elderly woman out of her life savings.    
This is simply because, as I’ve said, we can allow that the psychopath is attributability-responsible for his 
action in the case. And I think the same can be said of the political leader case. That is, while that case 
functions as a counterexample to the (H) principle, it does not function as a counterexample to the (A) 
principle. The political leader is plausibly attributability-responsible for leading his country into a 
materially devastating war. So, as far as the (A) principle is concerned, there is nothing amiss with the 
idea that something has gone horribly morally wrong for him.   
But more positively, the plausibility of the (A) principle is derived from the plausibility of the basic idea 
that we make normative demands on the actions and attitudes of persons or agents. We don’t make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
when I do this you will be in pain and you won’t like it,” he says, “but so what?”—so they simply fail to constitute 
any sort of constraint on his deliberations or motivations (Shoemaker 2011, p.629). 
26 Talbert (2008) makes this distinction.  
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normative demands, for example, on inanimate objects or the mechanical proceedings of nature. The 
domain of normative requirements does not extend beyond the actions and attitudes of persons (perhaps it 
extends to persons themselves (i.e. assessments of one’s character)). Of course, we do “attribute” things 
to inanimate objects and to the proceedings of nature.  And we use the language of “responsibility” to do 
so. To return to an example above, it’s perfectly intelligible to say that the avalanche was responsible for 
the destruction of the ski lodge. Note, however, that it’s not plausible to understand this in terms of 
attributability as I’ve outlined that notion. Rather, what is plausible is that the avalanche is causally 
responsible for the destruction of the ski lodge.27 And this (the fact that it is merely causally responsible) 
is at least one reason why we would not say that the avalanche violated some normative requirement by 
destroying the ski lodge. 
7. Attributability and Access  
To illustrate the basic point so far, consider another case: 
DUMMIES: Susan is driving in an obstacle course full of life-like dummies, and her objective is 
to run all of the dummies over. She has been led to believe that it is just a game and there are no 
real people on the obstacle course. Unbeknownst to Susan, however, a real person has snuck onto 
the course and in the process of doing her best to succeed in the game Susan runs the person over. 
 
Not only is Susan not morally blameworthy (she does not seem to be the appropriate subject of reactive 
attitudes or sanctions), Susan is not even attributability-responsible for running a real person over (where 
the event is to be understood under that description).28 The fact that Susan runs a real person over is not 
rationally related to her evaluative commitments (whatever they are). As such, we would not adjust our 
assessment of Susan’s character, make decisions about the kinds of plans we would make with her, or 
become less inclined to associate with her on the basis of this event.  
It is natural to wonder just why Susan is not attributability-responsible for running the real person over in 
this case. I think the most plausible explanation is that attributability—like blameworthiness—implies 
some kind of epistemic access. Many philosophers find it highly plausible that norm violation can occur 
in ignorance. But, as I’ve noted, equally many find it implausible that blameworthiness works the same 
way. Again, appeals to excuses in certain contexts highlight this fact. Non-culpable ignorance is often 
(though not always) a paradigm excuse or exculpation from blame. The thought here, then, is that 
attributability-responsibility is enough like being open to blame in this respect. It comes with a kind of 
condition of accessibility. The fact that there is a real person on the obstacle course is inaccessible to 
Susan in the relevant sort of way. The idea is that this explains why Susan is not attributability-
responsible for running the real person over. 
It’s not clear exactly how the condition of accessibility should be spelled out. For a start, we might say:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 To be sure, I wouldn’t be able to say much if someone put pressure on me to explain exactly what the difference 
is. My first response would be to say that the avalanche does not express any evaluative commitments, or manifest 
an agential self in destroying the ski lodge. It doesn’t have any evaluative commitments or an agential self. Of 
course, in the context of someone pressing me on this issue, these sorts of notions are exactly what we’ll want to 
know a lot more about. See Gibbons (2013, Ch.6) for an interesting discussion of some of the difficulties in this 
area. 
28 More on this point about the description shortly. 
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Necessarily, an agent is attributability-responsible for Φ-ing only if they are in a position to 
know that they are Φ-ing.  
Note that the condition is not that the agent must know that they are Φ-ing. There is of course a big 
difference between knowing and being in a position to know. For example, one can fail to know that they 
are Φ-ing where it would be appropriate to say, “they should have known.” If one is not even in a position 
to know, it’s far less clear there is any sense to the claim that they should have known. After all, knowing 
is not something the agent is in a position to do. That said, a good articulation of the accessibility 
condition will also need to add that an agent can of course fail to be in a position to know when they 
ought to have been in a position to know. For example, doctors are obligated to read about the latest 
important findings in their area. Now imagine a GP who doesn’t bother, and so ends up making an error 
that kills a patient. The doctor was not in a position to know that what she was doing was an error 
(according to the latest findings), but she ought to have been in a position to know.29 So perhaps the 
access condition should go:  
Necessarily, an agent is attributability-responsible for Φ-ing only if they are in a position to 
know that they are Φ-ing (and they have not culpably failed to put themselves in a position to 
know that they are Φ-ing).  
There are no doubt further refinements we could make to such a condition. But the basic idea is that if S is 
not in a position to know that they are Φ-ing (and they have not culpably failed to put themselves in a 
position to know), it’s not at all clear that their Φ-ing bears a rational relation to their evaluative 
commitments. Again, this seems like the best explanation of why Susan is not attributability-responsible 
for running a real person over.  
Since attributability is understood in terms of actions or attitudes that bear a rational relation to the 
agent’s evaluative commitments, it is also natural to ask: What does the accessibility condition on 
attributability imply about an agent’s self-knowledge? That is, what does it imply about the agent’s 
knowledge of their own evaluative commitments?  One might worry that, if it involves the idea that 
agents must know what their evaluative commitments are in order to for their Φ-ing to stand in a rational 
relation to those commitments (and thus for them to be in the market for counting as attributability-
responsible for Φ-ing), agents will fail to count as responsible in a large number of cases in which they 
intuitively are. After all, our evaluative commitments are sometimes (likely often) opaque to us (consider 
cases of denial or repression).  
However, there is a clear distinction between an agent’s having the right kind of access to the conditions 
under which they count as Φ-ing, and an agent’s having access to what their evaluative commitments are. 
The accessibility condition on attributability does not imply that agents must be in a position to know 
what their evaluative commitments are in order to be attributability-responsible for Φ-ing (perhaps 
something like that is required for answerability). All the accessibility condition on attributability says is 
that the agent must have the right kind of access to the conditions under which they count as Φ-ing, in 
order for their Φ-ing to stand in a rational relation to the agent’s evaluative commitments, or manifest 
their agential self. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Thanks to Duncan Pritchard for this example.  
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There is also an interesting question about the description under which the action or attitudes of an agent 
count as attributable to them. For example, let’s say for sake of argument that Susan is attributability-
responsible for running something over. How do we decide what to count as the appropriate description of 
an action or attitude that an agent is attributability-responsible for? It is plausible that Susan is 
attributability-responsible for running something over that looks just like a dummy. It is far less plausible 
that Susan is attributability-responsible for running a real person over (qua real person). What explains 
the difference? I think the best explanation is that Susan does not have the right kind of access to the fact 
that she is running a real person over. Judgments about the descriptions under which actions or attitudes 
count as attributable to agents are nicely explained by the accessibility condition on attributability.  
8.  The Attributability View 
Taking the access condition on attributability together with (A), we get the result that when an agent is 
not in a position to know that they are Ø-ing, this undermines the judgment that in Ø-ing the agent 
violates some normative requirement. The suggestion, then, is that (A) and the accessibility condition on 
attributability are at least two of the commitments underlying the natural reaction. We can quickly see the 
account in action by returning to the BIV case. The BIV is not in a position to know that she fails to 
proportion her beliefs to what she knows (when she believes, say, that she has hands). Thus according to 
the accessibility condition, the BIV’s failure to proportion her beliefs to what she knows is not something 
that is attributable to her. And because the BIV’s failure to proportion her beliefs to what she knows is not 
attributable to her, according to the (A) principle this undermines the judgment that she violates a 
normative requirement in so doing. So we can see that the proposal provides an explanation of what 
underlies the natural reaction to E=K. And the proposal of course generalizes. That is to say, any view 
that implies that an agent can be normatively required to Ø when they are not in a position to know that 
they are normatively required to Ø will conflict with (A) and the accessibility condition on attributability. 
This way of underwriting the natural reaction implies that anyone who endorses such a view owes an 
account of what is wrong with the (A) principle or the accessibility condition on attributability, or both. 
That is what accounting for the natural reaction amounts to.  
I do not suggest that we ought to endorse the natural reaction. Rather, my aim has been to provide an 
account of the natural reaction that makes either endorsing it or explaining it away look important. So 
why might the Attributability View make this look important, exactly? For starters, I said above that the 
weaker the commitments underlying the natural reaction are, the harder it will be to explain it away. It is 
worth pointing out, then, that (A) is a weaker thesis than (H), at least in the sense that it involves a much 
weaker sense of responsibility. That is, (H) turns on considerations of what it takes to be blameworthy. 
I’ve agreed with Shoemaker that this is something over and above what it takes to be attributability-
responsible. The minimal condition on an action or attitude being attributable to an agent is that the action 
or attitude bears a rational connection to the agent’s evaluative commitments. It has nothing to do with an 
agent’s being responsive to standards governing their relationships with others. It is relatively easy to 
imagine cases of agents violating normative requirements via actions or attitudes that do not also violate 
any standards governing their relationships with others. But it is difficult to imagine cases of agents 
violating normative requirements via actions or attitudes that do not bear a rational relation to the agent 
qua agent (i.e. to their evaluative commitments).  
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Another important point is that on the present view, excuses are possible. I noted above that one way of 
putting what the proponent of the (H) view has in mind is that the presence of an excusing condition 
serves to undermine the judgment that a normative requirement has been violated. Having an excuse just 
means that one’s action or attitude fails to violate the relevant norm(s). One way of putting the present 
proposal is to say that, not just any sort of excusing condition, but rather a particular kind of excusing 
condition serves to undermine the judgment that normative requirements are violated. In particular, when 
an excusing condition is such that the agent no longer counts as attributability-responsible for some action 
or attitude, this undermines the judgment that an action or attitude violates a normative requirement. 
Under such conditions, the relevant action or attitude no longer counts as an expression of the agent’s self 
qua agent (does not bear a rational relation to the agent’s evaluative commitments). In this way, when 
Williamson appeals to the idea that the BIV is unjustified but nevertheless excused for believing that she 
has hands, we are not forced to reply with a proposal that effectively eliminates the possibility of excuses 
altogether. We can agree with Williamson that there are of course cases of agent’s violating normative 
requirements and being excused for it (the political leader; the psychopath). However, we can maintain 
that his appeal to excuses in the BIV case is not helpful, because that is a case in which the excusing 
condition is such that the agent does not count as attributability-responsible for failing to proportion her 
beliefs to what she knows.  
Another compelling feature of the view arises in the context of a related discussion, which I can only 
touch on briefly here. It concerns a distinction between what is sometimes called “factual ignorance” and 
“evaluative ignorance”, and the relevance this has for judgments about culpability. Consider the following 
case: 
50s FATHER: Suppose Don is your typical television father from the late 50s or early 60s. He 
loves his children and does what he can to try to keep them happy. He puts money away for his 
son to go to school. He puts money away for a sailboat for his daughter. Although his daughter 
has said repeatedly that she wants to go to school, he sees no reason to help her because he sees 
no reason for women to go to college (Littlejohn 2014, p.144). 
Clayton Littlejohn plausibly says that Don ought to have saved for his daughter’s education. And he 
maintains this is so, even though Don had no evidence that would rationally support the belief that he 
ought to do so (that is to say, even though he is “evaluatively ignorant”). Littlejohn and others argue that 
there is an asymmetry between the appropriateness of blame in cases of evaluative versus factual 
ignorance. They think, in addition to violating normative requirements, agents in cases like 50s FATHER 
can even be the appropriate subjects of blame – despite being evaluatively ignorant. “Because Don 
shouldn’t act like a sexist and his sexism isn’t an excuse for his wrongdoing, he’s culpable for his 
wrongful behaviour” (Littlejohn 2014, p. 144). And Littlejohn argues that this leads to problems for those 
who think, for example, that the BIV is not merely excused but justified in believing that p despite factual 
ignorance. How can factual ignorance justify while evaluative ignorance sometimes doesn’t even excuse? 
This is an enormously complex issue worth exploring in much more detail. I will simply suggest here that 
the Attributability View gets the right results in this new sort of case. That is, Don is attributable for 
failing to save for his daughter’s education. This is because his decision to not save for his daughter’s 
education bears a rational connection to his evaluative commitments. So it is consistent with the view to 
maintain that he violates a normative requirement in so doing (the view leaves it open whether or not Don 
is blameworthy). More generally, the Attributability View will allow that actions arising out of evaluative 
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ignorance can be attributable to the agent, while actions arising out of factual ignorance cannot—or 
rather, those cases that violate the condition of accessibility on attributability I put forward in Section 
Seven cannot. 
9. Conclusion 
I’ve examined three potential ways of spelling out Gibbons’ claim that there is a natural reaction to the 
general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of 
one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The paper had two main aims. One was to make the 
natural reaction look like something that needs to be accounted for. The other was to offer a clear and 
explicit explanation of precisely what that means. Accounting for the natural reaction means doing one of 
two things. One can endorse a view of normativity according to which people are always in a position to 
know what their normative requirements are. Or, one can reject (A) or the accessibility condition on 
attributability (or both), and explain away their intuitive plausibility. Concerning the first option, 
Williamson of course thinks there can be no such view of normativity.30 Thus, he would take the second 
route. Perhaps the majority would follow him. I hope to have made enough of a case for the 
Attributability View to make this seem like an interesting project.  
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